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Abstract
Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that 
low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and 
corporate loans. This softening – especially for mortgages – is amplified by securitization 
activity, weak supervision for bank capital and too low for too long monetary policy rates. 
Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries 
with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor-rule residuals 
experienced a worse economic performance afterwards. These results help shed light on the 
origins of the crisis and have important policy implications.  
Keywords: lending standards, monetary policy, securitization, bank capital, financial 
stability.
JEL classification: G01, G21, G28, E44, E5. 5
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Non-technical summary 
This paper investigates the fundamental causes of the recent financial crisis and in particular the 
role played by a number of contributing factors highlighted by many commentators. Several, among 
researchers and policy makers alike, have suggested that levels of interest rates that were too low 
(both short- and long-term), coupled with a widespread use of financial innovation and weak 
supervision standards, led to an excessive softening of lending standards.
Using data on Euro area and U.S. lending standards from bank lending surveys, this paper reports 
robust evidence that lending standards to firms and households are softened when short-term 
interest rates (monetary policy rates) are low. The softening is even amplified when, at the same 
time, securitization activity is high, supervision for bank capital is weak and monetary policy rates 
have been too low for too long, especially for mortgage loans. 
When comparing the impact of short-term and long-term interest rates, the analysis shows that the 
softening impact of low short-term rates is statistically and economically more significant than the 
effect of long-term rates, directly and in conjunction with securitization and supervision standards. 
In fact, we do not find robust evidence that low long-term rates soften lending standards, somewhat 
in contrast with the hypotheses of many commentators who argued that the financial crisis was 
caused by an excessive risk-taking stemming from low levels of long-term interest rates, linked to 
current account imbalances.  
The recent financial crisis was also followed by a severe economic recession in most countries. The 
last part of the paper provides some suggestive evidence on the linkages between the excessive 
softening of lending standards and the costs of the crisis. Countries that prior to the financial crisis 
had softer lending standards related to comparatively low monetary policy rates (measured by 6
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negative Taylor-rule residuals) experienced a worse economic performance afterwards, measured 
by real, fiscal and banking variables.
Historically many financial crises have been preceded by low levels of short-term interest rates. In 
the recent crisis, the impact of low monetary policy rates may have been even greater given the 
concurrence of three elements: a strong reliance of banks on short-term liabilities to leverage up, a 
weak supervision for bank capital, and a widespread use of financial innovation (notably 
securitization). The results shown in the paper indicate that the softening impact on lending 
standards of these elements taken in isolation was amplified by their interaction prior to the crisis. 
Banks fund mainly through short-term liabilities and the presence of significant bank agency 
problems may have turned the abundant liquidity into an excessive softening of lending standards.
These findings shed light on the origins of the recent crisis and have important policy implications. 
In particular, results suggest that monetary policy rates affect financial stability. Hence, monetary 
policy decisions should pay more attention to financial stability issues, while banking supervision 
and regulation should take into account monetary policy effects. This conclusion, therefore, 
supports the new responsibilities of the European Central Bank and of the Federal Reserve on 
macroprudential supervision to monitor systemic risk.  7
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“One (error) was that monetary policy around the world was too loose too long. And that created this just huge 
boom in asset prices, money chasing risk.  People trying to get a higher return.  That was just overwhelmingly 
powerful... We all bear a responsibility for that”…  
“The supervisory system was just way behind the curve.  You had huge pockets of risk built up outside the 
regulatory framework and not enough effort to try to contain that. But even in the core of the system, banks got 
to be too big and overleveraged. Now again, here’s an important contrast. Banks in the United States, even with 
investment banks now banks, bank assets are about one times GDP of the United States. In many other mature 
countries - in Europe, for example – they’re a multiple of that.  So again, around the world, banks got to just be 
too big, took on too much risk relative to the size of their economies.”   
Timothy Geithner, United States Secretary of the Treasury, “Charlie Rose Show” on PBS, May 2009 
I. Introduction 
Europe and the U.S. have experienced the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression (the banking sector in particular), followed by a severe economic recession.   
What were the causes of the financial crisis? Acharya and Richardson (2010), Allen and 
Carletti (2009), Rajan (2010) and Taylor (2008) suggest that the key contributing factors 
were an excessive softening of lending standards due to too low levels of short-term 
(monetary policy) and long-term (government bond) interest rates, a concurrent widespread 
use of financial innovation resulting in high securitization activity, and weak supervision 
standards, especially for bank capital.
1 In this paper, we test these hypotheses.
Low interest rates may entail more risk-taking in lending by banks, directly and in 
conjunction with weak banking supervision standards and high securitization. Because of 
severe agency problems in banking (due to bail-outs and liquidity assistance), low interest 
rates may induce banks to soften their lending standards by improving banks’ liquidity (Allen 
and Gale, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2009a; Acharya and Naqvi, 2010) and net worth 
(Adrian and Shin, 2010; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). Since banks rely mostly on short-
term funding, low short-term rates may spur risk-taking more than low long-term rates 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2006; Adrian and Shin, 2009). Moreover, low interest rates make 
riskless assets less attractive and may lead to a search-for-yield by financial intermediaries 
(Rajan, 2005). Securitization of loans indeed results in assets yielding attractive returns for 
investors and also enhances bank lending capacity, especially when the capacity constraint is 
binding (in times of high credit growth, partially stemming from low monetary policy rates). 
1 See also Besley and Hennessy (2009), Blanchard (2008, 2009), Brunnemeier (2009), Calomiris (2008), 
Diamond and Rajan (2009b), Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009), and numerous editorial and op-ed articles since 
summer 2007 in The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Economist. Nominal monetary policy 
rates in most developed countries were the lowest in almost four decades and, in many countries, they were 
below rates implied by a Taylor-rule and/or negative in real terms (Taylor, 2007; and Ahrend et al., 2008). 8
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As a consequence, the impact of low interest rates on the softening of lending standards may 
be stronger with securitization. Finally, in this environment, strong banking supervision 
standards, by limiting the effects of bank agency problems, should reduce the softening 
impact of low interest rates on lending standards.
2
We empirically analyze the following questions: Do low levels of short- and long-term 
interest rates soften bank lending standards? Is this softening more pronounced when 
securitization activity is high or banking supervision standards are weak? Is there a too low 
for too long effect of monetary policy rates? Finally, did countries with softer lending 
standards before the financial crisis due to softer monetary conditions have a worse economic 
performance afterwards? 
There are two major sets of identification challenges. First, it is very difficult to obtain 
data on the lending standards applied to the pool of potential borrowers (including 
households and firms that were rejected), and to know whether, how and why banks change 
their lending standards. Second, monetary policy is endogenous, as it depends on the local 
economic conditions. In addition, banking supervision is often a responsibility of the same 
central bank that decides monetary policy rates, and securitization activity depends on 
lending activity, and hence on monetary policy conditions. 
Concerning the data, we use the detailed answers of the confidential Bank Lending 
Survey (BLS) for the Euro area countries and of the Senior Loan Officer (SLO) Survey for 
the U.S. Euro area national central banks and regional Feds request banks to provide 
quarterly information on the lending standards that they apply to firms and households. The 
detailed information reported in the surveys is very reliable, not least because the surveys are 
2 Low levels of interest rates also affect bank risk-taking through other channels. First, low (risk-less) rates 
increase the attractiveness of risky assets. This is the case in a mean-variance portfolio framework, but also in 
habit formation models (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), where agents become less risk-averse during economic 
booms because their consumption increases relative to their status-quo; thus, by increasing real economic 
activity, lower monetary policy rates may reduce investors’ risk aversion (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009). 
Second, there could be monetary illusion associated to low levels of interest rates, thus inducing higher risk-
taking to boost returns (Shiller, 2000; and Akerlof and Shiller 2009). Third, since banks finance themselves at 
short maturity and lend at longer maturities, low short-term rates by increasing the yield curve slope (as 
opposed to low long-term rates) may induce banks to soften lending standards (Adrian, Estrella and Shin, 
2010). Fourth, low rates may reduce adverse selection problems in credit markets and consequently decrease 
screening by banks (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). Fifth, an environment where central banks focus only on 
price stability may result in too low monetary policy rates, fostering in turn bubbles in asset prices and credit 
(Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Zhu, 2008). For the recent crisis, Acharya and Richardson (2010) argue that 
the fundamental causes of the crisis were the credit boom and the housing bubble. For Taylor (2007), these were 
largely spurred by too low monetary policy rates. 9
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carried out by central banks, which are in most cases the bank supervisors and can cross-
check the information received with exhaustive hard banking data.
3 It should also be noted 
that we analyze the lending standards in the most relevant countries for the recent financial 
crisis, as the crisis has mainly affected the U.S. and European countries. 
  To address the endogeneity of monetary policy, we exploit the exogenous cross-
sectional variation of monetary policy conditions in the Euro area (e.g. measured by Taylor-
rule residuals, see Taylor, 2008). In the Euro area, monetary policy rates are identical across 
countries, but there are significant differences in terms of GDP and inflation. Moreover, 
banking supervision is a responsibility of the national authorities, whereas monetary policy is 
set by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). There is also significant 
cross-country variation in securitization activity, partly stemming from legal differences. 
Furthermore, through time fixed effects we can control for unobservable time-varying 
common shocks that affect the monetary policy decisions of the ECB. In this case, the 
identification is largely cross-sectional. By contrast, when we analyze only the U.S. the 
identification relies exclusively on the time series dimension. 
We find robust evidence that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften 
lending standards, for both firms and households. This softening, especially for mortgages, is 
amplified by high securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital, and too low for 
too long monetary policy rates. Moreover, the impact of low short-term rates on the softening 
of standards is statistically and economically more significant than the effect of low long-
term interest rates, directly and in conjunction with securitization and supervision standards.
4
In fact, we do not find robust evidence that low long-term rates soften lending standards. 
We also provide suggestive evidence on the costs of the softening of lending standards. 
We find that countries with softer lending standards related to negative Taylor-rule residuals 
3 See Del Giovane et al. (2010) for an example of publicly available cross-checking using detailed supervisory 
data on bank lending from Italy. It should be noted that the lending standards from the surveys are not only 
correlated with actual credit spreads and volume (see online Appendix and Ciccarelli et al., 2010) but are also 
good predictors of credit and output growth (see Lown and Morgan, 2006, for the U.S. evidence, and De Bondt 
et al, 2010, for the Euro area). 
4 A key contributing factor to the recent crisis may have been the “saving glut and the existence of current 
account imbalances” implying that savers (mainly in emerging economies) were looking for investment 
opportunities abroad (see Bernanke, 2005; Besley and Hennessy, 2009; Rajan, 2010). The type of investment 
often mentioned was U.S. long-term government bonds. However, there is evidence that investors were also 
seeking to buy short-term assets (Gros, 2009); in fact, Brender and Pisani (2009) report that about one third of 
all foreign exchange reserves are in the form of bank deposits. 10
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(low monetary policy rates) prior to the financial crisis had a worse economic performance 
afterwards, measured by real, fiscal and banking variables. All in all, according to the 
findings, low short-term rates – in particular too low for too long monetary policy rates – 
were a key determinant of the last financial and economic crisis. They led to a softening of 
lending standards and the consequent accumulation of risk on banks’ assets. High 
securitization activity and weak supervision for bank capital, moreover, amplified the impact 
of low monetary policy rates. 
We contribute to the literature in two dimensions, on the origins of the recent crisis and 
on monetary policy transmission through the banking sector. First, we analyze in the two 
largest economic areas – the Euro area and the U.S. – the potential key contributing factors to 
the recent crisis put forward by many commentators and academics.
5 The special setting of 
the Euro area (for monetary policy, securitization activity and banking supervision) provides 
an excellent platform, almost a natural experiment, for identification of these drivers. Second, 
as far as we are aware, this paper is also the first to analyze whether monetary policy and 
long-term rates affect bank lending standards for firms and households in conjunction with 
securitization and banking supervision, providing empirical support to recent theories by 
Allen and Gale (2007), Diamond and Rajan (2009a), and Adrian and Shin (2010).
6
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and the empirical 
strategy. Section III discusses the results, and Section IV presents the conclusions. 
II. Data and Empirical Strategy 
A. Lending standards 
The main datasets used in the paper are the answers from the bank lending surveys for 
the Euro area (the BLS) and for the United States (the SLO). National central banks and 
5 We thank Tobias Adrian for showing in his discussion (at the RFS-Yale conference on The Financial Crisis) 
that our main results using Euro area data also held for the U.S. We also thank the editor and an anonymous 
referee for suggesting to include the U.S. data in the paper. 
6 For the effects of monetary policy through financial intermediaries and the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy, see Adrian and Shin (2010). For direct evidence on monetary policy rates and risk-taking, see Jiménez et 
al. (2010a) and Ionannidou et al. (2010) who respectively analyze corporate loans from Spain and Bolivia. For 
indirect evidence, see Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Axelson, et al. (2007), Den Haan et al. (2007) and 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009). Lown and Morgan (2006) also analyze the effects of monetary policy on 
lending standards, but their main focus is to assess the predictive power of U.S. corporate lending standards for 
GDP and credit growth.  11
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regional Feds request banks (senior loan officers, such as the chairperson of the bank’s credit 
committee) to provide quarterly information on the lending standards they apply to customers 
and on the loan demand they receive, distinguishing between business, mortgage and 
consumer loans. Concerning the supply of credit, attention is given to changes in lending 
standards, to the factors responsible for these changes, and to the different credit conditions 
and terms applied to customers – i.e. whether, why, and how lending standards are changed.
The Euro area results of the survey – a weighted average of the answers received by 
banks in each Euro area country – are published every quarter on the website of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). In a few countries the aggregate answers of the domestic samples are 
published by the respective national central banks. However, the overall sample including all 
the answers at the country and bank level is confidential. For the U.S. we use the publicly 
available data published quarterly on the website of the Federal Reserve Board.
7
Data from the Euro area BLS are available since 2002:Q4. The main set of questions did 
not change since the start of the survey. While the current sample covers the banking sector 
in the 16 countries comprising the Euro area, we restrict the analysis to the 12 countries in 
the monetary union as of 2002:Q4, thus we work with a balanced panel. Over this period we 
consistently have data for Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The sample of banks is representative 
of the banking sector in each country.
8 This implies that it may comprise banks of different 
size, although some preference was given to the inclusion of large banks. Data from the U.S. 
survey are available for a longer time period. When including the U.S. in the panel analysis 
we use the same time span as for the Euro area. We also run some regressions using only 
data for the U.S. to exploit the longer time series dimension. In this case we start the analysis 
in 1991:Q2. As we aim at analyzing banks’ lending decisions before the financial crisis, we 
stop the analysis in 2008:Q3. 
7 Lending standards are the internal guidelines or criteria for a bank's loan policy (see Lown and Morgan, 2006, 
and Freixas and Rochet, 2008). For the Euro area survey, Berg et al. (2005) describe in detail the setup. For the 
aggregate data, see http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html. The response rate is 
100%. There are eight central banks partially reporting the answers of their sample (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal). However, there are some differences in how data are 
reported. For example, some central banks report net percentages, others diffusion indexes or only charts. For 
the U.S. survey, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey, and Lown et al. (2000). 
8 When foreign banks are part of the sample, the lending standards refer to the credit policy in the domestic 
market. 12
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Since we are interested in the actual lending decisions by banks we use the answers 
related to changes in lending standards over the previous three months (see Appendix A for 
the specific questions). The questions imply only qualitative answers and no figures are 
required: banks indicate softening, tightening or no change of standards. Following for 
instance Lown and Morgan (2006), we quantify the different answers on standards by using 
the net percentage of banks that have tightened their lending standards over the previous 
quarter, which is defined as follows: the difference between the percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening of lending standards and the percentage of banks reporting a softening 
of standards. Therefore, a positive figure indicates a net tightening of lending standards.
9 We 
use this variable for corporate, mortgage and consumer loans. 
A main distinction between the surveys in the Euro area and in the U.S. is that in the 
SLO the questions on the factors affecting lending standards are asked only for corporate 
loans and no comparable information is available for loans to households; in addition, the 
factors mentioned in the SLO are somewhat different from those in the BLS. Therefore, to 
use both Euro area and U.S. data, we focus on whether (how much) lending standards 
change, and control for borrowers’ quality using macro-variables proxing for general 
economic conditions (as in Lown and Morgan, 2006).
10 We use the answers related to the 
factors when we analyze supervision standards for bank capital. In this case, since we use an 
indicator of the stringency of bank capital requirements, for consistency we use the answers 
from the BLS related to restrictions to banks’ capital and liquidity constraints. Given the lack 
of similar data for the U.S., we only do this exercise for the Euro area.   
B. Macroeconomic and financial variables 
The macro and financial variables included in the main analysis are short-term 
(monetary policy) rates, long-term (government bond) interest rates, GDP growth, inflation, 
9 The use of this statistic implies that no distinction is made for the degree of tightening (softening) of lending 
standards in the replies. The results obtained using diffusion indexes, using weights for the degrees of tightening 
(softening), do not differ from the ones obtained with net percentages, hence, we do not report them as they also 
imply discretion when choosing the weights. 
10 The Euro area BLS also collects information on why the lending standards change, for both firms and 
households. Banks assess how specific factors affected their lending standards decisions. In particular, whether 
the changes in standards were due to changes in bank balance-sheet strength (bank liquidity, capital, or access 
to market finance), to changes in competitive pressures (from other banks, from non-banks and from access to 
market finance), or to changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness (collateral risk, value or outlook, including 
general economic conditions). See also Appendix A and D and the online Appendix. 13
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securitization, and supervision standards for bank capital (see Appendix B for a detailed 
description of these variables). 
 For monetary policy we use the quarterly average of overnight interest rates, the EONIA 
rate for the Euro area (as published by the ECB) and the fed funds rate (as published by the 
Fed). Monetary conditions are also proxied by the Taylor-rule residuals obtained by 
regressing the overnight rates on GDP growth and inflation.
11 We estimate the residuals for 
the Euro area with panel least squares (LS) regressions, imposing common coefficients for all 
12 countries, given the common monetary policy. For the U.S., the residuals are estimated 
with an OLS regression. A positive residual indicates relatively high monetary policy rates 
(tight monetary conditions), while negative residuals proxy for low rates (soft conditions). To 
measure whether monetary policy rates have been too low (high) for too long, we count the 
number of consecutive quarters in which the residuals have been negative (positive). For the 
Euro area, we start counting in 1999:Q1 (when the euro was introduced).
To assess the impact of long-term rates, we use the 10-year government bond interest 
rates for each Euro area country and for the U.S. The main macroeconomic controls are the 
annual real GDP growth rate and the inflation rate, defined as the quarterly average of 
monthly inflation rates expressed in annual terms.
12
To measure securitization activity, we use for the Euro area the ratio between the volume 
of all the deals involving asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities in each quarter and 
country (as reported by Dealogic) normalized by GDP.
13 For the U.S., data on asset-backed 
securities issuance are available and, hence, we use these in the regressions. Since 
11 Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano et al. (1996), among others, use the overnight interest rate as the 
indicator of the U.S. stance of monetary policy. In the Euro area, the Governing Council of the ECB determines 
the corridor within which the overnight money market rate (EONIA) can fluctuate. Therefore, the overnight rate 
is also a sensible measure of the monetary policy stance in the Euro area. For robustness, we have also used 
different Taylor-rule specifications, both for the overnight and the 3-month EURIBOR (e.g. the rate implied by 
a standard Taylor-rule with coefficients 0.5 for both inflation and output gap, see Taylor, 1993). 
12 We also use term spread and credit spread for robustness purposes (see the results in Appendix D). In non-
reported regressions we have also used expectations of GDP growth and inflation from the ECB, but these 
variables are not available for all Euro area countries and with quarterly frequency. We have also controlled for 
house price growth, credit growth, and country risk (e.g. the difference of the long-term interest rate between 
each country and Germany). Results are similar.  
13 The securitization variable is country-specific since we have information about the nationality of the 
securitized collateral. We only take into account securitization deals for which the underlying collateral resides 
in one of the Euro Area countries. Data availability does not allow us to precisely distinguish between retained 
and non-retained securitization since 2002, nevertheless, before the crisis, the bulk of securitized assets were not 
retained in the balance-sheets of the banks.14
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securitization activity is endogenous to the level of short-term interest rates, for robustness 
we instrument it with a time invariant indicator based on the legal environment for 
securitization in each Euro area country.
14 The view taken is that a more regulated 
environment can be conducive to a framework of “legal certainty” which may be more 
attractive for investors. Indeed the indicator shows a strong positive correlation with 
securitization activity. In addition, it results in ample cross-country variation in the Euro area.
Given that regulatory arbitrage for bank capital seems to have been key in precipitating 
the financial crisis (Acharya and Richardson, 2010), we use a measure of supervision 
standards for bank capital, a bank capital stringency index. Capital stringency is an index of 
regulatory oversight of bank capital (see Appendix B for details), it does not measure 
statutory capital requirements but the supervisory approach to assessing and verifying the 
degree of bank capital at risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Barth et al., 2006). 
C. Summary statistics 
Figure 1 shows how (the net percentage of) lending standards for both corporate and 
mortgage loans and the Taylor-rule residuals evolved over time ahead of the financial crisis.
15
For the Euro area we plot the weighted average using the outstanding amount of loans in 
each country as weights. 
For the Euro area (Figure 1 Panel A), the residuals were negative most of the time 
pointing to accommodative monetary conditions between 2003 and 2006. There is also ample 
cross-country variation as one can see from Appendix C (where the summary statistics are 
shown). Figure 1 also shows that lending standards for corporate and mortgage loans 
followed a similar time series pattern as monetary policy rates. In fact the correlation 
between the lending standards and monetary policy rates is 77% (71%) for corporate 
(mortgage) loans (before the crisis).
16 It is interesting to note that the average net percentage 
14 The indicator is constructed with country-level information contained in the report “Legal Obstacles to Cross-
Border Securitization in the EU” (European Financial Markets Lawyers Group, 2007) and, therefore, we use it 
only for the Euro area analysis. See Appendix B for details. 
15 For the sake of simplicity, we omitted from the Figures the standards for consumer credit. Note that this type 
of credit represents less than 10% of total bank loans outstanding in the Euro area and around 15% in the U.S.  
16 Similarly the coefficient of the regression for the weighted Euro area of lending standards on Taylor-rule 
residuals over the same time period was 26.55 for corporate loans and 13.21 for mortgage loans, in both cases 
statistically significant at 1%. See also Appendix D and footnote 23. 15
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change of standards for mortgage loans was lower than for business loans. Interestingly, 
when monetary conditions started to tighten, lending standards were tightened with a lag, 
suggesting a lasting effect of rates too low for too long. From Appendix C, we can see that 
there is a lot of cross-sectional variation on the number of periods with consecutive low 
(high) Taylor-rule residuals: a maximum of 20 quarters of relatively low monetary policy 
rates and a maximum of 13 quarters of relatively high rates. 
For the U.S. (Figure 1 Panel B), the chart and the summary statistics show similar 
developments. Interestingly, monetary policy rates remained low for 19 consecutive quarters 
between mid-2001 and mid-2006. During this period standards for both corporate and 
mortgage loans were significantly softened. The tightening of standards followed the 
tightening of monetary policy and standards for mortgage loans were tightened earlier than 
for business loans. The correlation between lending standards for business loans and Taylor-
rule residuals is around 27% when starting in 1991 (32% starting in mid-2001). 
Figure 2 shows how lending standards and Taylor-rule residuals are cross-sectionally 
related. Lower Taylor-rule residuals are related to softer lending standards, for both business 
and mortgage loans. For the Euro area countries, where overnight rates are the same but 
business cycles and economic policies are different, the R-squared for mortgages is 13% and 
for corporate loans is 28%.
Appendix C shows the summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. 
Panel A shows that the average overnight rate for the Euro area is 2.80 (4.14 for the U.S. 
since 1991) and the standard deviation is 0.79 (1.65 for the U.S.). Average Taylor-rule 
residuals for all the countries were -0.11, indicating that on average monetary conditions 
were accommodative, with a standard deviation of 0.85, a minimum value of -1.77 and a 
maximum of 2.73. The long-term rates had an average of 4.05 and a standard deviation of 
0.45. Average GDP growth was 2.72% while its standard deviation was 1.81, showing ample 
cross-section and time series variability since the values ranged from a minimum of -1.96 to 
a maximum of 8.40. Average inflation was 2.48 with a standard deviation of 0.95.
In the Euro area, securitization volume as a ratio of GDP had an average of 2.19 and a 
standard deviation of 2.35. In the U.S., where we use the rate of growth of asset-backed 
securities, securitization has an average of 9.01 and a standard deviation of 34.97. For the 16
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Euro area, the securitization instrument based on regulation varied from 1.5 to 14, and capital 
stringency index ranged from 3 to 7, reflecting mainly cross-country variation.
Panel B shows the average statistics for lending standards in the Euro area and in the 
U.S. As already indicated, there is ample variation of lending standards applied to non-
financial firms and to households over the sample period and across countries. The average 
measure of lending standards was positive across type of loans, which implies average 
tightening over the period. This may signal a bias towards tightening. Hence, in our baseline 
regressions we analyze deviations over the mean values by introducing country fixed effects, 
reflecting also the fact that the number and the structure of banks as well as the regulatory 
and supervisory banking environment differ across countries. 
D. Empirical strategy 
We want to empirically analyze the effects of short-term (monetary policy) and long-
term interest rates on the softening of lending standards directly and also indirectly in 
conjunction with securitization activity, banking supervision standards, and too low for too 
long monetary policy rates.  
As we explained in detail in the Introduction, the identification strategy for the Euro area 
is better since the BLS data are fully consistent and the monetary policy rate is the same 
across countries, despite significant differences in business cycles and economic policies.
17
Therefore, we first run the analysis for the 12 Euro area countries reporting the BLS answers 
since 2002:Q4. Because the role of the U.S. financial sector was crucial in the current crisis 
and data on lending standards in the U.S. are available for a longer time series, we also 
analyze the U.S. alone (1991:Q2 to 2008:Q3). However, when it is possible and sensible, we 
run panel regressions including both Euro area countries and the U.S. (a panel of 13 
countries) from 2002:Q4 to 2008:Q3. 
The empirical strategy relies on a series of panel regressions where the baseline has the 
following functional form: 
i t i t i t i t i i t CONTROLS LTrate STrate LS , , 1 , 1 , 1 , H G J E D  u  u  u      
17 For example, Spain and Ireland grew at a much higher rate and with a higher inflation rate than Germany and 
France, the two largest Euro area countries, over the period 2002-2006 (Taylor, 2008). In fact, Camacho et al. 
(2008) find evidence showing that the length, deep and shape of business cycles differ across European 
countries and that these differences are not decreasing over time. 17
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where LSt,i is the net percentage of banks which have tightened credit standards in quarter t
and country i (data from the bank lending surveys).
18 STratet-1,i is the short-term interest rate 
at time t-1 in country i (either the nominal overnight rate or the Taylor-rule residual) and 
LTratet-1,i is the long-term (government bond) interest rate. CONTROLSt-1,i are the other 
macroeconomic and financial variables used, mainly GDP growth and inflation. In the 
benchmark specification, we introduce country fixed effects since banking structure, 
regulation and supervision differ in each country and, as shown e.g. by Laeven and Levine 
(2009), these factors affect bank (loan) risk-taking. Whenever possible, we also introduce 
time fixed effects to control for unobservable time-varying common shocks that affect 
monetary policy decisions and lending standards. Moreover, to assess the impact of short-
term and long-term interest rates on lending standards in conjunction with too low for too 
long monetary policy rates, securitization activity and banking supervision standards, we 
introduce interaction terms in our baseline regression. 
Given the questions we address (on monetary policy and lending standards) and the 
empirical specification we use, we face problems of correlation both over time (due to the 
lending standards) and across countries (due to the Euro area common monetary policy). This 
implies that the residuals of the regressions are correlated both between and within panels. 
Since we have 24 quarters of data but only 12 (13) countries, double clustering of standard 
errors is not sensible; thus we run GLS panel regressions with country (and when possible 
time) fixed-effects where parametrically we allow the residuals to be correlated both cross-
sectionally and over time.
19 When we only analyze the U.S., we use LS with robust standard 
errors.
18 In an online Appendix, we also analyze the change in lending standards related to specific factors, and the 
different loan conditions such as lending spreads, volume, maturity, covenants and collateral. 
19 This is a common approach adopted to address two sources of correlation of residuals (see Petersen, 2009). If 
the time effect were fixed (non-random), time dummies would completely remove the correlation between 
countries and LS estimation with clustering by country would yield unbiased standards errors. However, 
(purely) time fixed effects may not be capturing fully all the unobserved information affecting monetary policy 
decisions and lending standards (across the different Euro area countries). Therefore, double clustering (time 
and country) would be needed. But, due to the limited number of countries (12 or 13 in our case), clustering 
both by country and time is likely to produce biased estimates (see Petersen, 2009). GLS instead allows to 
impose a parametric structure to take into account the time-varying variance-covariance matrix of error terms to 
correct the residuals for the correlation both within and between countries. We implement a test for serial 
correlation of order one following Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003) and check for autocorrelation of 
higher order and, due to the evidence, especially for mortgages and consumer credit, we model the residuals as 
an auto-correlated process of order one (see online Appendix for the results of the tests). For robustness, we 
report the main results using either a dynamic panel with one lag or, to control for correlation of higher degree, 
a LS panel with standard errors clustered by country, finding similar results (see Appendix D).  18
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III. Results
The results are reported as follows. We first analyze the impact of short-term interest 
rates on lending standards (Table 1). Then, we analyze the impact of both short-term and 
long-term rates on lending standards directly (Table 2, our baseline regression), and 
indirectly through the interaction with too low for too long monetary policy rates (Table 3), 
securitization (Table 4), and banking supervision (Table 5). Finally, we analyze the relation 
between short-term rates and lending standards prior to the financial crisis and the economic, 
banking, and fiscal performance afterwards (Table 6).
Short-term interest rates  
Table 1 analyzes in depth the impact of monetary conditions on lending standards 
applied to business, mortgage and consumer loans in the Euro area (Questions 1 and 8 of the 
BLS, see Appendix A). As an introductory step to the main analysis of the paper we look at 
the impact of monetary conditions on lending standards only in the Euro area data where 
identification is strong.
20 Monetary conditions are first measured using overnight rates 
(EONIA) and then Taylor-rule residuals. 
From Columns 1 to 6, the dependent variable total lending standards (LS) is the net 
percentage of banks reporting a tightening of standards for loans to non-financial 
corporations over the previous quarter. We proceed in steps including country fixed effects 
and macro controls. Column 1 shows the results when regressing lending standards on 
EONIA with no country fixed effects and no macro controls. In column 2 we introduce 
country fixed effects and in column 3 both country fixed effects and macro controls. The 
coefficient of overnight rates is similar across the different specifications, statistically 
significant at 1%, and it decreases slightly with the inclusion of additional controls, either 
country fixed effects or macro, becoming 22.828*** in the most demanding specification 
(Column 3).
21
In Columns 3 to 6, we replace EONIA with Taylor-rule residuals. Results are similar. 
Moreover, with Taylor-rule residuals we can introduce time fixed effects (Column 6). 
20Given the similarities of the tables reported in the paper (particularly Tables 1 to 5), we describe in detail only 
the first table. However, as pointed out in the empirical strategy, results from Table 2 to 5 are crucial. 
21*** denote statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  19
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Therefore, the identification is (mainly) cross-sectional since we control for time-varying 
common shocks.
22 Column 6 shows that softer monetary conditions soften standards for 
corporate loans (18.006***), controlling for both time and country fixed effects, GDP and 
inflation.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient is negative for GDP growth and positive for 
inflation (in fact, throughout the different specifications of the paper, these coefficients in 
general remain statistically significant and with the same sign). The results suggest that 
higher GDP growth softens lending standards – i.e. lending standards are pro-cyclical – and 
that a higher inflation rate implies a tightening of lending standards, maybe as a consequence 
of expected increases in monetary policy rates in the near future.  
In Columns 7 to 12 we report the results of the same regressions for lending standards 
to households for house purchase and in columns 13 to 18 for standards for consumer credit. 
The direction of the impact is similar for all type of loans and regressions. However, the size 
of the coefficient of overnight rates indicates that the impact of short-term rates on lending 
standards is higher for loans to non-financial corporations than for loans to households: in the 
most demanding specification, with all controls and fixed effects, the coefficients are 
18.006*** for business loans (column 6), 15.106*** for mortgages (column 12), and 
6.686*** for consumer credit (column 18).  
Results are also highly economically significant: the softening of standards for business 
loans due to the impact of a one standard deviation decrease of Taylor-rule residuals is more 
than five times higher than the softening due to a comparable increase of real GDP growth 
(for the most demanding specification, the effects are -13.68 and -2.618 respectively). 
Similarly, our results suggest that monetary policy rates have an impact on lending standards 
for mortgage loans that is almost double the impact of GDP growth (approximately -11.48 
and -6.101 respectively), while the impact of GDP growth is not significant for consumer 
credit (Column 18). 
22 It should be noted that with time fixed effects we control for unobservable time-varying common shocks that 
affect the monetary policy decisions by the Governing Council of the ECB. Note also that this provides 
exogenous cross-sectional differences of monetary conditions since the deviation from the Euro area average for 
a country at a given point in time is due to the common monetary policy rate and the imperfect synchronization 
of business cycles within the Euro area.
.20
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Short-term and long-term interest rates  
Table 2 shows the results of our baseline regression where we include both short- and 
long-term interest rates, country fixed effects and macro controls (GDP growth and 
inflation). In Panel A we use Taylor-rule residuals and in Panel B we use nominal short-term 
(and long-term) interest rates. First, we analyze the results for the Euro Area, then we 
introduce the U.S. in the panel and, finally, we analyze the U.S. alone. 
For the Euro area (column 1 to 6), results for short-term rates are the same as in Table 1 
(and still significant at 1% for all type of loans and controls). Without time fixed effects, the 
coefficients of long-term rates are positive and significant for corporate and mortgage loans. 
However, once we introduce time fixed effects, long-term rates are significant only for 
business loans and, moreover, with a negative impact. This suggests that, if anything, higher 
long-term rates soften lending standards for firms, whereas low short-term rates soften 
standards for all type of loans (and the results are robust to the different controls). These 
results are confirmed when introducing U.S. data, either pooled with Euro area data 
(Columns 7 to 12) or alone (Columns 13 to 15), or in other alternative specifications (see 
Appendix D).
23 In addition, Panel B, using overnight nominal rates also confirms these 
results.
Comparing the results of the Euro area vis-à-vis the U.S alone, we find that short-term 
rates are economically more important in the Euro area. This is consistent with the fact that 
banks in the Euro area have always financed themselves significantly through short-term 
interbank debt (Upper 2006; Allen et al., 2004). Thus, short-term rates may be economically 
more important in the Euro area than in the U.S. in affecting lending conditions. However, in 
the last decade U.S. banks have also significantly financed through short-term (wholesale) 
claims. Another difference in the results is that in the Euro area the coefficient of long-term 
23 In one specification in Appendix D, where we weight the countries by their GDP level, we find very similar 
results as the main, un-weighted regressions, thus suggesting that our findings are not driven by small countries. 
Another interesting result shown in Appendix D (confirmed in the online Appendix) is that low short-term 
interest rates soften lending standards by improving bank balance sheets, thus suggesting that monetary policy 
affects bank loan risk-taking by increasing liquidity and capital. See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kashyap 
and Stein (2000) for the credit channel of monetary policy. 21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1248
October 2010
interest rates loses the statistical significance depending on the type of loans and controls, 
whereas in the U.S. it is always negative and significant.
24
All in all, the results in Table 2 do not confirm the hypotheses of many commentators 
who argued that mainly the low levels of long-term interest rates prior to the financial crisis 
caused an excessive softening of lending standards and risk-taking (see e.g. Besley and 
Hennessy, 2009). However, there is robust evidence that low monetary policy (short-term) 
rates softened lending standards for loans to firms and households. 
Too low for too long levels of monetary policy rates 
Table 3 analyzes whether the persistence of very accommodative monetary conditions – 
rates (too) low for (too) long – matters for the softening of lending standards. For the sake of 
brevity, we concentrate on the whole sample of Euro area countries and U.S. We first 
introduce the number of periods of relatively low monetary policy rates (# periods of low 
monetary policy) in the baseline regression. As we can see from Columns 1, 3 and 5, for all 
type of loans, the length of periods of relatively low monetary policy rates contributes to the 
softening of lending standards. This effect is over and above the direct effect of current 
Taylor-rule residuals, which is still positive and significant.  
We then introduce the variable # periods of low monetary policy in levels and 
interacted with current Taylor-rule residuals (see Columns 2, 4, 6). Especially for mortgage 
loans, the results suggest that the impact of (current) low monetary policy rates on the 
softening of lending standards is amplified by too low for too long monetary policy rates. 
Evidence for the U.S. alone, with longer time series, confirms these results.  
Securitization, short-term and long-term interest rates 
In Table 4 we analyze the impact of short- and long-term interest rates on lending 
standards via securitization activity, introducing this variable in the baseline regression. 
Panel A shows the results for the Euro area and Panel B for the U.S., where we use data on 
24 Comparing our U.S. results with those from Lown and Morgan (2006), we find that monetary policy rates 
affect lending standards, but mainly when we control for long-term interest rates (see the results in the online 
Appendix and in Table 2). Since in the U.S. the effects of short and long-term interest rates on lending standards 
have opposite signs and short and long-term rates are correlated, not including long-term rates biases the results 
(an omitted-variables problem). Our results suggest that controlling for long-term rates may be crucial to study 
monetary policy effects. See also the online Appendix for the results discussed but not shown in the paper. 22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1248
October 2010
the net issuance of securitized assets. For identification purposes, we use Taylor-rule 
residuals, macro controls and both country and time fixed effects.  
For the Euro area (Panel A), when we introduce our measure of securitization activity, 
results on the level effect of short-term rates are not altered and, as expected, the impact of 
securitization is negative and significant at 1% for mortgage loans, thus indicating that higher 
securitization leads to softer lending standards for mortgages (see Columns 1, 4 and 7). Most 
importantly, the coefficient of the interaction between securitization and short-term rates is 
positive and statistically significant (at 1% or 5%), implying that the impact of low short-
term rates on the softening of lending standards is amplified by securitization activity. The 
results are similar for all type of loans and robust to the inclusion of other controls, in 
particular to the interaction of long-term rates and securitization.
25 Interestingly, the 
coefficient of the interaction with long-term rates is not significant.  
For the U.S. (Panel B), results are similar to the Euro area but there are some 
differences. First, when we introduce the measure of securitization activity, results on short-
term rates are not altered and the impact of securitization is negative and significant at 1% for 
all loans (except in column 7 for consumer credit which is only at 10%), thus indicating that 
higher securitization leads to softer lending standards across the board.
26 Second, the 
coefficient of the interaction between securitization and short-term rates is positive and 
statistically significant (at 1%) for all type of loans, but it is not robust to the inclusion of the 
interaction between long-term rates and securitization.
27
Monetary policy affects credit growth, thereby possibly impacting securitization 
activity. To address this endogeneity, we instrument securitization with an indicator of the 
relevant regulatory environment in each country of the Euro area (see Section II). As shown 
in Table 4, bottom of Panel A, the securitization instrument is highly significant in explaining 
securitization activity (the t-statistic in the first stage regression is 5.87***), thus the 
25 It is interesting to note that the softening impact of low levels of monetary policy rates, but not the length of 
loose monetary policy, is amplified by securitization (non-reported result). This may also be due to the lack of 
statistical power when three or more interactions are presented in the regressions. 
26 For evidence on the softening of lending standards due to securitization, see Keys et al. (2009) and Mian and 
Sufi (2009). For an exhaustive analysis of recent financial innovations in banking, see Gorton and Souleles 
(2005), Gorton (2008, 2009), and Gorton and Metrick (2009).  
27 The interaction between long-term rates and securitization is positive for mortgage and consumer loans, thus 
indicating that securitization reduces the impact of high long-term rates on the softening of lending standards. 
This may be because lending profits are less dependent on lending yields if banks can securitize (sell) the loans.  23
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instrument does not suffer from weak instrument concerns (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
Moreover, the estimates from the second-stage regression suggest that the impact of low 
short-term rates on the softening of standards is higher when the component of actual 
securitization activity predicted by the regulation instrument is larger. Results are similar 
across all type of loans, but the strongest effects are for mortgage loans.  
All in all, the analysis suggests that the impact of low short-term rates on the softening 
of lending standards is amplified by securitization – i.e., high securitization activity and low 
monetary policy rates complement each other in the softening of standards. On the other 
hand, the results for long-term rates, if anything, suggest that securitization may reduce (not 
enhance) the effect of long-term interest rates on lending standards.
Supervision standards for bank capital, short-term and long-term interest rates 
In Table 5 we introduce in the baseline regression the capital stringency index which is 
a measure of regulatory oversight (supervision) of bank capital (see Laeven and Levine, 
2009). This measure has some cross-sectional variation, but almost no time variation (see 
Section II); hence, to fully exploit the cross-sectional variation, we use Taylor-rule residuals. 
Given that the measure of supervision refers to bank capital, for consistency we use the 
answers from the survey related to bank balance-sheet constraints (bank capital and 
liquidity). These changes are not related to borrower’s quality and risk, and thus they may be 
a better proxy for changes in (loan) risk-taking. Unfortunately, this information is not 
available in the SLO for mortgage and consumer loans and, therefore, we restrict this 
analysis to the Euro area. 
Results in Table 5 show that, independently of the macro and long-term rate controls 
and of time fixed effects, the impact of low monetary rates on the softening of standards (due 
to bank balance-sheet constraints) for mortgage loans is amplified when supervision 
standards for bank capital are weak (Columns 4 to 7).
28 This result is consistent with the idea 
that both the softening of lending standards for mortgages and bank capital regulatory 
arbitrage have been crucial in leading the banking system to the recent financial crisis 
(Acharya and Richardson, 2010).
28 Results for business and consumer loans are not significant. See Appendix D for the baseline results using the 
softening of standards due to bank balance-sheet constraints and competition. See online Appendix for all the 
factors affecting lending standards.  24
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All in all, these results suggest that low levels of monetary policy rates increase bank 
loan risk-taking especially when banking supervision is weak. This is consistent with theories 
suggesting that agency problems in the banking sector are crucial to explain the risk-taking 
channel associated to low monetary policy rates (Allen and Gale, 2004 and 2007; Rajan, 
2010; Adrian and Shin, 2010).
Lending standards prior to the financial crisis and real implications afterwards   
The results so far suggest that low (monetary policy) short-term – rather than low long-
term – interest rates soften lending standards, for both firms and households. We now 
analyze whether the softening of lending standards stemming from low monetary policy rates 
in the period preceding the financial crisis had significant costs. In Table 6 we display the 
correlations between monetary policy rates and lending standards before the crisis and 
measures of economic, fiscal and banking performance afterwards.
29
The results suggest that countries with lower Taylor-rule residuals (expansive monetary 
conditions) had a worse economic performance afterwards. Moreover, countries with softer 
lending standards prior to the crisis related to negative Taylor-rule residuals also experienced 
higher costs.
30 The economic performance after the start of the crisis is measured by lower 
bank credit growth, more tightening of lending standards due to bank balance-sheet weakness 
(capital and liquidity),
31 lower aggregate private consumption, higher unemployment rate, 
higher fiscal deficit and CDS spreads on government debt. Interestingly, the results on GDP 
growth are mixed, suggesting that governments tried to reduce the real costs of the crisis 
through expansive fiscal policy. However, other key variables – aggregate consumption and 
unemployment – unambiguously point to significant real effects. Importantly, softer lending 
29 Bank risk problems may transmit through the system through interbank contagion and other mechanisms (see 
Iyer and Peydró, 2010, and Bandt, et al., 2009). Once the banking system is in trouble, a credit crunch is more 
likely to happen (see Jiménez et al., 2010b) in turn affecting the real economy (see Ciccarelli et al., 2010). For 
real effects induced by bank failures, see Ashcraft (2005). See Gan (2007) for loan and firm level data evidence. 
For the effects of credit as an autonomous source of macroeconomic fluctuations, see Gorton and He (2008). 
30 We analyze this by looking at the correlations either with the part of lending standards predicted by Taylor-
rule residuals or with the average of standards when Taylor residuals were negative prior to the crisis. The 
correlation between measures of economic performance and the part of lending standards predicted by Taylor 
residuals is identical, by construction, to the correlation with the Taylor residuals; therefore, we do not report it.  
31 As explained in Section 2, information on changes in lending standards due to bank balance-sheet capacity is 
not available in the U.S. SLO, therefore this indicator is analyzed only for the Euro area. 25
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standards not associated to monetary policy conditions (i.e. the residual of standards on 
Taylor-rule residuals) are not related to higher costs during the crisis.
All in all, the suggestive evidence is consistent with a significant softening of lending 
standards due to low monetary policy rates leading to an accumulation of risk prior to the 
crisis. When the risk materialized and the capacity of bank balance-sheets was impaired, 
banks started to reduce lending, thereby inducing a real and fiscal crisis. 
IV. Conclusions
Many commentators have suggested that low levels of short- and long-term interest 
rates induced an excessive softening of lending standards in the run-up to the financial crisis. 
This view is summarized for example in the letter to Her Majesty the Queen on the origins of 
the current crisis written by the British Academy (see Besley and Hennessy, 2009).
32 In this 
paper we have analyzed empirically this issue. 
Analyzing both the Euro area and the U.S. lending standards, we find robust evidence 
that low short-term (monetary policy) rates soften lending standards rather than low long-
term interest rates. High securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital and too 
low for too long monetary policy rates amplified, especially for mortgages, the softening 
impact of low monetary policy rates. Moreover, we provide suggestive evidence that too low 
for too long monetary policy rates, by inducing a softening of lending standards and a 
consequent buildup of risk on banks’ assets, were a key factor leading to the financial crisis 
and possibly triggering, through the subsequent bank credit reduction, a real and fiscal crisis.
A low level of short-term interest rates indeed has historically preceded many financial 
crises (Calomiris, 2008). In the recent crisis, the impact of low monetary policy rates may 
have been even greater given the concurrence of three elements: the strong reliance on short-
term liabilities to leverage up, a weak supervision for bank capital, and the high level of 
financial innovation (notably securitization). Our results indicate that the softening impact on 
32 “The ‘global savings glut’ led to very low returns on safer long-term investments which, in turn, led many 
investors to seek higher returns at the expense of greater risk…(Monetary policy) interest rates were low by 
historical standards. And some said that policy was therefore not sufficiently geared towards heading off the 
risks. Some countries did raise interest rates to ‘lean against the wind’. But on the whole, the prevailing view 
was that monetary policy was best used to prevent inflation and not to control wider imbalances in the 
economy.”26
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lending standards of these elements taken in isolation was amplified by their interaction prior 
to the recent crisis. Moreover, low monetary policy rates may be a crucial factor for risk-
taking as funding liquidity for banks is mostly short-term (and thus depends on monetary 
policy) and the presence of significant bank agency problems may have turned the abundant 
liquidity into an excessive softening of lending standards. In this sense it is interesting to note 
what Chuck Prince, former Citigroup Chairman, said when describing why his bank 
continued financing loans despite mounting risks: “When the music stops, in terms of 
liquidity, things will be complicated. But, as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up 
and dance. We’re still dancing.” (Financial Times, July 2007).
33
All in all, our findings help shed light on the origins of the recent crisis and have 
important policy implications. In particular, results suggest that monetary policy rates affect 
financial stability. Hence, monetary policy decisions should pay more attention to financial 
stability issues, while banking supervision and regulation should take into account monetary 
policy effects. Our results, therefore, support the new responsibilities of the European Central 
Bank and of the Federal Reserve on macroprudential supervision to monitor systemic risk.  
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Figure 1: Taylor-rule residuals and lending standards
Panel B: US
Panel A: Euro area
Figure 1, Panel A, shows the Taylor-rule residuals and the lending standards for corporate loans and mortgage loans in the Euro area. 
Taylor-rule residuals are the residuals of the regressions of EONIA rates on GDP growth and inflation over the period 2002q3-2008q2.
The residuals are estimated separately for each country in the Euro area and a weighted average is then calculated using the outstanding
amount of loans in each country. Data for 12 Euro area countries are included (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). Lending standards for corporate and mortgage loans are the net 
percentages of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards for loans to enterprises and households in the Bank Lending Survey (BLS).
The Euro area figure is calculated using the same weights as for the Taylor-rule residuals over the period 2002q4-2008q3. Panel B shows 
Taylor-rule residuals and lending standards for corporate and mortgage loans for the US. Taylor-rule residuals are the residuals of the 
regressions of fed funds rates on GDP growth and inflation over the period 1991q1-2008q2. The lending standards are the net percentages 
of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards for corporate and mortgage loans in the Senior Loan Officer Survey( SLO) from
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Appendix A
The Bank Lending Survey (BLS)
Question Variable Definition of variables
Supply of loans Total lending standards for:
or credit lines to enterprises changed? (Q1) corporate loans
to households for house purchase changed? 
(Q8)
mortgage loans
to households for consumer credit and other 
lending changed? (Q8)
consumer loans
Factors affecting the supply of loans
A Costs of funds and balance sheet 
constraints
A1.Costs related to your bank's capital 
position
A2.Your bank's ability to access market 
financing
A3.Your bank's liquidity position
B Pressure from competition
C Perception of risk
A. Costs of funds and balance sheet 
constraints
B. Pressure from competition
C. Perception of risk
A. Costs of funds and balance sheet 
constraints
B. Pressure from competition
C. Perception of risk
The Senior Loan Officer Survey (SLO)
Question Variable Definition of variables
Supply of loans Total lending standards for:
approving applications for C&I loans or 
credit lines - other than those to be used to 
finance mergers and acquisitions - to large 
and middle-market firms changed? (Q1)
corporate loans
from individuals for mortgage loans to 
purchase homes changed? (Q9)
mortgage loans
for consumer loans othen than credit card 
loans changed? (Q8)
consumer loans
Over the past three months, how have your
bank’s credit standards for …
Net percentage=differencebetween the sum
of banks answering “tightened considerably”
and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of
banks answering “eased somewhat” and
“eased considerably" in percentage of the
total number of banks.
Q11 Over the past three months, how have 
the following factors  affected your bank’s 
credit standards as applied to the approval of 
consumer credit and other lending to 
households?
Lending standards due to bank balance sheet 
factors for mortgage loans=net percentage 
for A
Net percentage=difference between the sum 
of the banks answering "contributed 
considerably to tightening" and "contributed 
somewhat to tightening" and the sum of the 
banks answering "contributed somewhat to 
easing" and "contributed considerably to 
easing"
Q9 Over the past three months, how have 
the following factors  affected your bank’s 
credit standards as applied to the approval of 
loans to households for house purchase?
Lending standards due to bank balance sheet 
factors for mortgage loans=net percentage 
for A
Over the past three months, how have your
bank’s credit standards as applied to the
approval of loans…
Net percentage=differencebetween the sum
of banks answering “tightened considerably”
and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of
banks answering “eased somewhat” and
“eased considerably" in percentage of the
total number of banks.
Q2 Over the past three months, how have 
the following factors  affected your bank’s 
credit standards as applied to the approval of 
loans or credit lines to enterprises?
Lending standards due to bank balance sheet 
factors for corporate loans = average of the 
net percentage for A1, A2 and A342
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Appendix B
Macroeconomic and financial variables
Variables Definition Time span Data source
Overnight rate Quarterly average of the EONIA overnight interest rate 2002Q3-2008Q2 ECB
10-year rate Quarterly average of long-term (10-year) national government bond yield 2002Q3-2008Q2
Thomson Financial 
Datastream
GDP growth Annual growth of real GDP  2002Q3-2008Q2 Eurostat
Inflation Quarterly average of the monthly inflation rate expressed in annual terms 2002Q3-2008Q2 Eurostat
Securitization
Ratio between all deals involving asset-backed securities and mortgage-backed 
securities with collateral from the respective country and GDP for the same country 
2002Q3-2008Q2 Dealogic and Eurostat
Taylor-rule residuals
Residual of a panel regression of overnight rate (EONIA) on GDP growth and 
inflation
2002Q3-2008Q2
ECB and authors' 
calculation
# of periods of low monetary 
policy
Number of consecutive quarters in which the Taylor-rule residuals were negative 
since 1999:Q1.
2002Q3-2008Q2
ECB and authors' 
calculation
Overnight rate Quarterly average of the fed funds effective overnight interest rate 1991:Q1-2008:Q2
Thomson Financial 
Datastream
10-year rate Quarterly average of long-term (10-year) national government bond yield 1991:Q1-2008:Q2
Thomson Financial 
Datastream
GDP growth Annual growth of real GDP  1991:Q1-2008:Q2 Federal Reserve
Inflation Quarterly average of the monthly inflation rate expressed in annual terms 1991:Q1-2008:Q2 Federal Reserve
Securitization (US only) Growth rates of asset-backed commercial papers 1991:Q1-2008:Q2 Federal Reserve
Taylor-rule residuals




Datastream and authors' 
calculation
# of periods of low monetary 
policy
Number of consecutive quarters in which the Taylor-rule residuals were negative.
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Appendix B
Bank regulation/supervision and securitization indicators
Capital stringency index
The index ranges from 0 to 9 with higher values indicating more stringent capital requirements. 
The following questions are quantified according to the answers yes=1 and no=0 and then summed up to yield the index: 
1) Is the minimum capital asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with the Basel guidelines?
2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk?
3) Are market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from capital?
4) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted?
5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted?
6) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?
7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities?
8) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities?
9) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds?
Data sources:  See Barth, Caprio and Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation, Cambridge University Press, 2006
(see also the successive updates of the survey and Laeven and Levine, 2009).
Securitization regulation
The indicator ranges from 0 to 20 with higher values indicating more legal requirements surrounding securitization transactions.
The information is taken from the questions related to A. Securitization laws, B. SPVs,
and C. Transfer and ring-fencing of assets in the annex of the report Legal Obstacles to Cross-Border Securitization in the EU .
The answers are coded =0, 0.5, 1 according to how specific and regulated the legal framework is.
List of questions:
A. Securitization Laws
1) Is there specific legislation applicable to securitization?
2) Does the law provide any definition of securitization?
3) Which securitization techniques are governed by national law (traditional securitization, synthetic securitization etc…) ?
answer=1 if the law specifies securitization techniques
4) Are there any limitations in terms of types of securitized assets?
B. SPVs
5) Is it possible to effectively segregate or ring-fence the originator's assets?
6) What are the types of SPVs available in your jurisdiction for the purpose of securitization transactions?
answer=1 if SPVs can be established as a company
7) Does the law provide any specific restrictions regarding the place of establishment of the SPVs?
8) Are SPVs considered to be credit institutions?
9) What is the authority in charge of supervising SPVs?
answer=1 if SPVs are subject to the supervision of supervisory agency or central bank
10) Is it more common to use an offshore SPVs?
11) Does the law distinguish between SPVs acquiring receivables and SPVs issuing?
12) Does national legislation allow SPVs to engage in a wide range of financing activities?
13) Does the law permit the creation of segregated compartments or cells of assets and liabilities?
14) Are there any rules imposed by domestic legislation regarding the management of excess cash?
15) What are the requirements imposed by law for managing an SPVs?
answer=1 if well defined requirements are specified 
16) Are there any limitations in terms of shareholdings in management companies or SPVs?
C. Transfer and ring-fencing of assets
17) Does the law permit the ring-fencing of assets that are the subject of a securitization?
18) Are originators permitted to retain the economic benefits of the transferred assets?
19) Is segregation of assets legally possible on the basis of the provision of general characteristics or general information?
20) Are there any formalities imposed on transfer of assets? Is there a requirement to use a notary or produce similar evidence…?
Data source: Legal Obstacles to Cross-Border securitization in the EU , European Financial Markets Lawyers Group, 2007.44
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Euro area + US
US
Panel A:  Financial and macroeconomic variables
Panel B:  Lending standards
Euro area


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1248
October 2010
Appendix online
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation
corporate loans mortgage loans consumer loans corporate mortgage consumer
123 456
F(1, 11) 8.066 7.331 6.515 8.756 8.131 7.478
Prob(>F) [0.016] [0.020] [0.027] [0.012] [0.015] [0.018]
# of observations 276 276 276 299 299 299
corporate loans mortgage loans consumer loans corporate loans mortgage loans consumer loans
123 456
Residuals i,t-1 0.363 0.332 0.446 0.436 0.398 0.493
[4.96]*** [3.77]*** [4.59]*** [5.82]*** [4.54]*** [5.30]***
Residuals i,t-2 0.134 0.054 0.075 0.141 0.069 0.087
[1.85]* [0.78] [1.01] [2.08]** [0.98] [1.23]
# of observations 264 264 264 286 286 286
R-squared 0.2 0.14 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.25
Residuals i,t
Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003) test for autocorrelation in panel data
Autocorrelation of residuals
Serial correlation
Euro area Euro area + US
Euro area Euro area + US
The Table shows the results of the Wooldridge test for serial correlation of order 1 in panel data on data on total lending standards for corporate,
mortgage and consumer loans. Total lending standards is the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards in each country in the
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for the Euro area and in the Senior Loan Officer Survey (SLO) for the US. They are the answers to Questions 1 and 9 of
the BLS and to Questions 1, 8 and 9 of the SLO. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the surveys. Columns 1 to 3 show the value of the F-
statistic and the probability of rejection of the hypothesis of no correlation for the Euro area panel. The panel includes 12 Euro area countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). Columns 4 to 6 show the value of the F-
statistic and the probability of rejection of the hypothesis of no correlation for the panel including 12 Euro area countries and the US. The test is run
over the period 2002q4-2008q3.   
The Table shows the results of 2
nd stage panel least squares (LS) regressions to check for autocorrelation. The residuals are calculated from LS panel
regressions of total lending standards for corporate, mortgage and consumer loans on overnight rates, 10-year rate, GDP and inflation (i.e. the 
benchmark regressions reported in Table 2, Panel B). The Euro area panel includes 12 Euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). The Euro area + US panel includes also the US. Regressions are 
estimated over the period 2002q4-2008q3.   52
ECB











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B: Correlations between lending standards and lending spreads in the Euro area 
Lending standards and actual lending behavior




















The figure shows the correlations over time between lending standards (net percentage of banks that tightened their lending
standards over the previous quarter) and loan spreads, measured as the difference between lending rates applied by banks and 
EONIA rates. The graph shows the correlation between (lending standards)t and (loan spreads)t+k (with k that can take positive or
negative values).  Correlations are calculated using country-level data for 12 Euro area countries. Lending standards for corporate
and mortgage loans are from the Bank Lending Survey (BLS). Correlations are calculated over the period 2002q4-2009q4. 54
ECB








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Working PaPer SerieS
no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo